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E. F. CORPORATION V. SMITH: VOIDABLE
PREFERENCE AND THE PROBLEMS OF
ANTECEDENT INDEBTEDNESS UNDER § 60(a)
One of the purposes underlying the Bankruptcy Act' is to bring
about an equitable distribution of the debtor's estate among his cred-
itors.2 To implement this purpose, the trustee in bankruptcy has the
power under § 60 of the Act to void preferential transfers made "to
or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent
debt."4 The problem of antecedent indebtedness has arisen recently
both in cases involving after-acquired property which secured ad-
vances made prior to or contemporaneous with security agreements
and in cases where advances were made subsequent to the security
agreement but prior to the acquisition of the collateral. 5 Generally,
the question in these cases has been when the transfer of the security
1 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
2 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); 3 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY § 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
Section 60 states in pertinent part:
a. (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account
of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing by or against him of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a
transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that
no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equita-
ble proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property shall be deemed to
have been made or suffered when it became so far perfected that no
subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create rights in
such property superior to the rights of the transferee . ..
b. Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor
receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with refer-
ence thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. . ..
11 U. S. C. § 96 (1970).
5 See, e. g., In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974); In re
King-Porter Co. 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th
Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants v. Union Bank &'Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). The "after-acquired" cases have been commented on at
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interest by the debtor is made in order to determine whether that
transfer is contemporaneous with or after the creation of the debt
itself. Since the creation of the debt usually occurs at a fixed time
under those circumstances, the time at which the transfer of the
security interest by the debtor is deemed to have been made has been
dispositive of the antecedent debt issue.
In contrast, in E. F. Corporation v. Smith,' the issue of antecedent
indebtedness arose where collateral, in existence at the time the secu-
rity agreement was executed, was pledged to secure debts which
might result from services subsequent to the security agreement as
well as those for past-performed services by the creditor. The Tenth
Circuit in E. F. Corporation held that since the transfer of the secu-
rity interest took place at the time the services were performed rather
than at the time of the agreement, the transfer was within four
months of bankruptcy and thus voidable under § 60. However, the
court did not deal with the issue of antecedent indebtedness. Consid-
eration of that question would have compelled a different result in the
case.
The creditor in E. F. Corporation, Elmer Fox & Company, en-
tered into a security agreement with the bankrupt, Rosen Oil Corpo-
ration, in November 1971. Prior to that date, Fox had rendered ac-
counting services to Rosen for which the latter still owed $20,000. In
order to secure the old debt and in contemplation of future account-
ing services, Rosen gave Fox a note for $40,149.44 secured by a mort-
gage and security interests in certain oil properties. Future services
were rendered and the parent of the bankrupt, Rosen Petroleum Cor-
poration, was billed $16,110 on February 28, 1972 and $3,900 on May
25, 1972. The petition in bankruptcy was filed on May 26, 1972.
As the financing and collecting arm of Fox, the E. F. Corporation
filed a proof of claim' and a reclamation petition8 alleging secured
great length. It is not the purpose of this comment to address the problems raised in
those cases. An excellent treatment of them is provided in Countryman, Code Security
Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970).
496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974).
' A creditor who has a claim against the bankrupt's estate must file a claim for
satisfaction of the debt. Sections 57 (a), (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 93
(1970), require that the creditor file a written and signed statement in either the court
of bankruptcy where the proceedings are pending or before the referee if the case has
been referred. The statement must set forth the creditor's claim and whether any
payments have already been made on it. Also, the statement constitutes prima facie
evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.
I To be distinguished from a proof of claim is a petition for reclamation. Such
petition seeks the release of particular property held by the bankruptcy receiver or
trustee. 2 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 721, at 147 (6th ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited
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status and seeking the collateral pledged on the note given to Fox in
November 1971. The referee denied secured status to the E. F. Corpo-
ration except as to $8,000 which had remained unpaid on the debt
pre-dating the November 1971 agreement. Thus, the E.F. Corpora-
tion was held to be unsecured as to the entire amount due for ac-
counting services performed within the four-month period preceding
the bankruptcy petition The referee based his denial of secured
status upon the finding that Fox had not been bound to perform
future accounting services under the November 1971 agreement and
that when Fox voluntarily performed the services within the four-
month period, it had reasonable cause to know of Rosen's insol-
vency." Accordingly, the referee held that the claim by the E. F.
Corporation for secured status as to the services billed within the
four-month period constituted an attempt to create an impermissible
preference. The district court affirmed the referee's decision and the
E. F. Corporation appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, E. F. Corporation contended that the debt created by
the performance of accounting services within the four-month period
immediately preceding the bankruptcy petition related back to the
November 1971 agreement between Fox and Rosen.11 The appellant
argued that the debt should relate back to the November 1971 agree-
ment because Fox had given value to Rosen on that date in the form
of a binding commitment to render future accounting services." E.
F. Corporation thus contended that the perfection of Fox's security
interest under local law took place outside the four-month period 3
and was therefore not a preference under § 60.
After upholding the lower court's award of $8,000 on the pre-
November 1971 debt," the Tenth Circuit rejected E. F. Corporation's
as REMINGTON]. Accordingly, "[alnyone who considers himself better entitled to the
possession of particular property than the ... trustee may apply to the court to have
such property released to him." 5A REMINGTON § 2474, at 284. Therefore, the reclama-
tion petition filed by the E. F. Corporation sought the release of the collateral which
had secured the note given to Fox in November 1971.
' The Tenth Circuit focused on the services performed and billed within the four-
month period preceding the bankruptcy petition because this is the relevant period in
which a preference for creditors arises, if at all, under § 60(a). A finding of a transfer,
§ 60(a)(2), within the four-month period, coupled with the satisfaction of the other
elements of § 60(a)(1) necessitates an analysis of the trustee's power to void transfers
to creditors under § 60(b). See note 4 supra.
11 496 F.2d at 831. Under § 60(b), a creditor's knowledge or reason to know of the
debtor's insolvency within the four-month period preceding bankruptcy is an essential
requirement in order for the trustee to be able to void a § 60(a) preference. See note 4
supra.
" 496 F.2d at 830.
12 Id.
" See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text infra.
"Id. at 830.
1975]
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relation-back contention. The court began its analysis by examining
the issue of when the "transfer" from Rosen to Fox took place. Since
a transfer, as defined in § 60(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 is made
at the time when it becomes "so far perfected" that the transferee's
rights are superior to any subsequent liens upon the transferred prop-
erty, the court turned to state law to determine when the requisite
perfection had occurred. 6 The pertinent state law was Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Kansas. 7 Under § 84-9-
303(1) of the Kansas Code, a security interest is perfected "at the
time it attaches." Attachment of a security interest as defined in §
84-9-204(1) does not occur until "value" is given. "Value" is defined
in § 84-1-201(44) to include "a binding commitment to extend credit"
and "consideration suffficient to support a simple contract. '"'8 The
key issue for the Tenth Circuit, then, was whether value was given
by Fox in November 1971 in the form of a binding commitment for
future services or whether it was given within the four-month period
when the services were actually performed. Relying upon and agree-
ing with the referee's and district court's findings that Fox had volun-
tarily performed its accounting services, the Tenth Circuit held that
value was not given until the services were performed within the four-
month period. Thus, the court held that the security interest at-
tached within four months of bankruptcy and did not relate back to
the November 1971 security agreement, and concluded that secured
status for Fox as to the value of the accounting services rendered
within the four-month period should be denied. 9
While there is some doubt concerning both the Tenth Circuit's
value analysis" and its conclusion that the debt accruing from the
15 See note 4 supra.
16 The Tenth Circuit, citing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 370
(1945), correctly stated the general principle that state law decides when a security
interest has been perfected for purposes of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. 496 F.2d at
830.
, KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 84, § 1-101 et seq. (1965).
" KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 84, § 1-201(44)(d) (1965).
" 496 F.2d at 831.
The Tenth Circuit's "value" analysis was simply that because Fox was not
bound to perform the future accounting services for Rosen, there was no value given
within the meaning of § 84-1-201(44)(a) of the Kansas Code which states that a person
gives value for rights if he acquires them "in return for a binding commitment to
extend credit. ... Thus, the argument goes, the converse of § 84-1-201(44) (a) is that
a person does not give value when he makes only a voluntary or optional commitment.
2 G. GILMORE, SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.6, at 937 (1965). The
apparent simplicity of the court's value argument is deceptive, however, when § 84-1-
201(44)(d) is examined. Under the sub-section, a person gives value for rights if he
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performance of accounting services could not relate back to the 1971
security agreement,2' other indicia, not relied upon by the court,
could nevertheless support the court's holding. Specifically, the in-
tent of Fox and Rosen as reflected in the terms of the security agree-
ment and the rights of Fox to the collateral for the note prior to the
four-month period lend support to the court's value analysis.
The intent of Fox and Rosen that value was not to be given by
the former until the accounting services were actually performed is
apparent from the terms of their security agreement.2 2 The note from
acquires them "in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
The question of whether sufficient consideration was given in return for a chattel
mortgage received by a creditor was analyzed in In re Schindler, 223 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Mo. 1963). There, the court held that the antecedent debt which the mortgage was to
cover was sufficient consideration for the giving of the mortgage. Id. at 519. Therefore,
there is at least a legitimate question as to whether the taking of the mortgage by Fox
from Rosen to secure past and future indebtedness was value under § 84-1-201(44). The
court in E. F. Corp., however, did not address that aspect of the "value" question.
21 Although apparently argued by the E. F. Corporation, the Tenth Circuit did not
consider the value and relation back ramifications of § 9-204(5) of the U.C.C. which
provides: "Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances
or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commit-
ment."
Since E. F. Corp. involved the future performance of services and not advances
of credit or loans of money, the future advance thrust of § 9-204(5) is arguably applica-
ble only by analogy. However, the "or other value" language of that section clearly
indicates that more than loans or advances are to be considered. The importance of §
9-204(5) with regards to E. F. Corp. is two-fold. First, the question as to whether Fox
was bound to provide future accounting services or whether, as held by the Tenth
Circuit, Fox merely performed them voluntarily within the four-month period is irrele-
vant. As one commentator has pointed out: "The obligation covered by a security
agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not the advances or
value are optional or obligatory." 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
204:15, at 188 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, case law decided under § 9-204(5) supports the argument
that value given subsequent to a perfected security agreement relates back to the
original agreement. See, e.g., John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis.
2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161, 163 (1972); Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 7, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). Under that interpretation of § 9-204(5), the original
loan or other giving of value and all subsequent value give rise to only one security
agreement as opposed to the view that each future giving of value gives rise to a new
or additional security agreement. 4 ANDERSON § 9-204:17, at 190.
2 Although not present on the facts in E. F. Corp., it is likely that the written
terms of the security agreement may indicate an intent to secure subsequent indebted-
ness. A mortgage which stated that it was to cover "this or any other advances" was
held to permit recovery by the creditor from the trustee in bankruptcy for funds
advanced subsequent to the mortgage. In re Upton, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. 65,399 (N.D. Ala. 1974). Deference to the terms of the security
agreement is clearly envisioned by § 9-201 of the U.C.C. which states: "Except as
1975]
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Rosen to Fox in November 1971 was for approximately twice the
amount of the debt then owed by Rosen. Because there would be no
reason to obtain a note and collateral securing twice the amount of a
debt unless later debts were contemplated, it is clear that value, in
the form of future accounting services to be rendered by Fox, was to
be given subsequent to the security agreement and that the debts
thus created were to be covered by the note given in November 1971.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's finding that Fox was not bound
under the terms of the security agreement to perform future account-
ing services indicates that value was to be given upon performance
of services in the future. That the parties could have made the terms
of the security agreement binding, and thus determinative of when
value was given under § 84-1-201(44) (a), supports the court's ration-
ale. Therefore, the intent of Fox and Rosen as evidenced by the terms
of the security agreement itself indicates that full value was not given
in November 1971. Rather, the giving of value was to be completed
upon performance of future accounting services.
In addition to the intent manifested by the terms of their agree-
ment, the full value issue can be analyzed from the standpoint of the
rights of Fox in the collateral prior to the four-month period. Regard-
less of whether Fox's commitment to provide services was voluntary,
as held by the Tenth Circuit, or binding, Fox could not have de-
manded satisfaction of the note prior to the performance of $40,000
worth of accounting services. Since only $20,000 of services had been
performed prior to the four-month period, Fox could only have de-
manded satisfaction to the extent of that indebtedness. Thus, prior
to the four-month period, Fox had not given full value to Rosen as
contemplated under the security agreement. Value was not fully
given until all the accounting services had been performed.
While the Tenth Circuit's value .analysis was arguably valid, the
court erroneously failed to determine whether the element of ante-
cedent indebtedness necessary for a § 60 preference was present in
E. F. Corporation.3 Indeed, the court's holding that full value was
otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms
between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors."
21 The six elements required for a preference under § 60(a)(1) are: (1) a transfer,
as defined in § 60(a)(2), of property by the debtor, (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(3) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (4) while the debtor is insolvent, (5) within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, (6) the effect of which will be
to enable to creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor
in the transferee's same class. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970); 3 COLLIER § 60.02, at 758-
59. If any of the six elements is absent in a transaction between a creditor and the
bankrupt, a preference does not exist. Bumb v. Valley Elec. Co., 419 F.2d 107, 108 (9th
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not given until the accounting services were performed within the
four-month period compels a finding that the transfer under § 60(a)
(2) was for contemporaneous considerationu and was therefore a valid
transfer that the trustee could not attack under § 6 0 .2
The validity in bankruptcy of a security agreement which secured
both current and future debts was analyzed by the Second Circuit in
Wolf v. Aero Factors Corporation.21 In that case, well before the four-
month period the bankrupt and creditor had entered into a factoring
agreement whereby the creditor would make loans from time to time
with security for those loans supplied by the bankrupt's accounts
receivable. Although some of the loans were made within the four-
month period, the court held that there was no § 60 preference be-
cause the creditor had paid a fair and present consideration.2 Thus,
Cir. 1969); Gentry v. Bodan, 347 F. Supp. 367, 371 (W.D. La. 1972); 3 CoLIER § 60.36,
at 912.
24 A transfer is not deemed to have been made under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
until value has been given. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra. Since the
Tenth Circuit held that value was not given until within the four-month period and
that the transfer occurred within that period, the transfer was for contemporaneous
consideration.
2 Interestingly enough, the issue of antecedent indebtedness with regards to past
and future services secured in a security agreement may not arise at all under the
proposed new Bankruptcy Act. H. R. REP. No. 10792, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Section 4-607(g) (1) of the proposed Act states: "'Antecedent debt' is a debt incurred
more than five days before a transfer paying or securing the debt. 'Antecedent debt'
does not include (A) a debt for personal services . . . ." However, Professor Country-
man suggests that, if understandable at all, such immunity from preference attack
would apply only to the pre-bankruptcy debts owed to workmen such as wages and
other compensation claims. He then adds that "what is not understandable is a policy
which immunizes the payment of compensation claims of corporate executives, doc-
tors, lawyers and plumbers from preference attack." Countryman, Some Good and
Some Bad Features of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, 7 U.C.C. L.J. 213, 226-27
(1975). In accord with Professor Countryman's view that the new definition of antece-
dent debt should be narrowly construed is Comment 6 of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States:
As a result of the definition [antecedent debt], payments to employ-
ees (with specified exceptions), utilities, and suppliers in the ordinary
course of business are not subject to preference attack. Payments of
those debts are payments of antecedent debts under the case law
interpreting the Act, but are [now] protected since employees, trade
creditors, and utilities ordinarily do not have reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor insolvent.
H.R. REP. No. 10792 at 169-70. Therefore, it would appear that the satisfaction of debts
arising from a security agreement similar to the one in E. F. Corp. would not escape
preference attack.
221 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955).
2 Id. at 291-92.
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the transfer of the bankrupt's accounts receivable upon the making
of the loans by the creditor within the four-month period was not for
antecedent indebtedness. Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the Wolf
rationale. 8
Like that in Wolf, the consideration provided by Fox in E. F.
Corporation in the form of later accounting services for Rosen was
contemporaneous with the transfer within the four-month period and
was not antecedent thereto. The giving by Rosen of the mortgage and
security interests in November 1971 did not change the nature of the
debt created by the accounting services performed within the four-
month period. As one commentator has pointed out: "A transfer [in
the § 1(30) meaning of the word] 9 to secure a future advance is in a
sense a transfer to a creditor in that it is made in contemplation of
becoming a creditor. . . .Manifestly, however, it is not for an ante-
cedent debt."3 By this view, there was no indebtedness to Fox for the
future accounting services until Fox provided consideration within
the four-month period.
Since the antecedent debt requirement of § 60(1) had not been
fulfilled at the time Rosen transferred the security interest within the
four-month period, the question remains whether Fox could have
recovered on the basis of possessing a perfected security interest
against the trustee's exercise of his powers under § 70(c).1 As the
" See, e.g., Gentry v. Bodan, 347 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. La. 1972) (a transfer of
property to the creditor within the four-month period in exchange for a lease cancella-
tion was a voidable preference only as to past rent due and not to the extent of relieving
the paying of future rent); Ackman v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 307 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (citing Wolf, court held that where the creditor loaned money within
the four-month period and was assigned accounts receivable and pledges of inventory,
the assignments were not preferential under § 60).
29 Apart from the definition of transfer regarding perfection of a security interest
under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, see note 4 supra, "transfer" in the more physical
sense of the actual giving of something as security is defined in § 1(30) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or parting with property or an inter-
est therein . . . as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge,
mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise ....
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970).
3 Rhode, The Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy: The Attack by the Trustee and
Defenses of the Creditor, 37 REF. J. 118, 121 (1963).
3' Under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970), the trustee has
all the powers and rights, as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy, of a judgment
or lien creditor of the bankrupt. Therefore, in E. F. Corp., if Fox had not perfected its
security interest prior to that date, its unperfected interest would have been subordi-
nate to the interest of the trustee under § 9-301(1)(b)(3) of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
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Tenth Circuit correctly pointed out, state law determines when
perfection of a security interest occurs.3" The court then considered
whether such perfection had occurred prior to the four-month period.
However, the relevant inquiry should have addressed the issue of
whether perfection occurred prior to bankruptcy because such perfec-
tion would have insulated the creditor's secured status from the trus-
tee's attack.
33
Under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Kansas, § 84-
9-303(1) provides that a security interest is perfected when it attaches
and other perfection prerequisites have been met.3 4 Attachment is
defined in § 84-9-204(1) as requiring that there be an agreement that
the security interest attach, that value be given, and that the debtor
have rights in the collateral. Clearly, Rosen, the bankrupt debtor,
had rights in the collateral securing the note at the time of the note's
creation in November 1971; it still had those rights within the four-
month period.3 5 It is also clear that the note and agreement for the
$40,000 contemplated that the security interest attach upon perform-
ance of the accounting services. The third requirement of § 84-9-
204(1) was also met within the four-month period. Fox gave "value"
upon performance of its services, since such would have been "consid-
eration sufficient to support a simple contract" under § 84-1-
201(44) (d) .6
3 496 F.2d at 830, citing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 370 (1945).
m Since a trustee under § 70(c) has only the rights of a judgment or lien creditor
as of, and following, the date that the petition in bankruptcy is filed, a security interest
perfected prior to that date would not be subordinate to the trustee's interest. 4
COLLIER § 70.51, at 617. That result is obvious from the language of § 9-301(1) of the
Code which states that an "unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights
of . . . (b) a person who becomes a lien creditor .... " Conversely, a perfected
security interest is not so subordinated.
34 KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 84, § 9-303(1) (1965). Section 84-9-303(1), in addition to
the attachment and filing requirements, also requires that §§ 84-9-304, 305, 306 be
complied with in order to perfect a security interest. However, those sections are not
applicable to E. F. Corp.. Section 84-9-304 deals with filing which was already required
of Fox by § 84-9-302(1). Section 84-9-305 refers to the situation where the secured party
has possession of the collateral-which was not the case in E. F. Corp. Similarly, §
84-9-306, which deals with the security interest in the "proceeds" obtained from a
disposition of the collateral, is not applicable in E. F. Corp. as there is no indication
that Rosen had disposed of the collateral securing the November 1971 agreement.
" There is no hint of fraud on Rosen's part in November 1971 as to the actual
existence of the property used as collateral for the note given to Fox. Likewise, there
is no indication that Rosen parted with that property prior to the litigation.
' The Fifth Circuit in In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971), held
that where the security agreement was executed prior to advances by the creditor,
value was given when the subsequent advances were actually made because that was
19751
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Once it was determined that Fox's security interest had attached
within the four-month period, perfection then depended upon satis-
faction of "all the applicable steps" as required by § 84-9-303(1).17
Section 84-9-302(1) of the Code requires the filing, subject to certain
exceptions not applicable in E. F. Corporation, of a financing state-
ment in order to perfect a security interest. Because the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the referee and district court in awarding the $8,000 still
owing on the debt for services prior to November 1971,1 it is apparent
that Fox had perfected its security interest at least as to that portion
of the note and accompanying collateral. Such perfection would have
required, under § 84-9-302(1), the filing of a financing statement.
Since only one note was given by Rosen to Fox for all the debts, past
and future, filing as to the past debts should also have sufficed for
perfection purposes as to the future debts. To require Fox to file
separate financing statements after every service performed in order
to meet § 84-9-302(1)'s filing requirement would seem unnecessary.39
Subsequent creditors would be put on notice by the prior filing.
Therefore, regarding the accounting services performed by Fox within
the four-month period, the perfection filing requirement should have
been deemed to have been met. On the basis of its perfected interest,
E. F. Corporation's claim against the trustee as to the services per-
formed within the four-month period should have been allowed. 0
when consideration had passed under § 1-201(44)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
446 F.2d at 727 & n.7.
3 See note 34 supra.
3' 496 F.2d at 830.
' The official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code support this point
about the prior filing by Fox:
If the steps for perfection have been taken in advance (as when the
secured party files a financing statement before giving value or before
the debtor acquires rights in the collateral), then the interest is per-
fected automatically when it attaches.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303, Comment 1.
An example of the notice resulting from filing is provided by In re Riss Tanning
Corp., 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). There, an advance clause in the security agreement
stated that the collateral was security for a $25,000 note and "any other obligation or
liability . . . due or to become due whether now existing or hereafter arising." The
court held that the clause was sufficient to put a subsequent creditor on notice even
though the debt to which the proceeds of the collateral were eventually applied was
one which arose from an entirely different note. Id. at 1213. The notice in E. F. Corp.
would be even more sufficient than that in Riss because Fox sought only to collect on
the face amount of the note which Rosen's assets originally secured in November.
" The E. F. Corporation's claim should have been allowed because it was per-
fected prior to the date the petition in bankruptcy was filed and thus was not subject
BANKRUPTCY
That the Tenth Circuit did not reach this result may have not only
serious commercial consequences but also may create doctrinal prob-
lems within § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The commercial consequences of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
E. F. Corporation can be illustrated by examining the after-acquired
cases which the opinion attempted to distinguish.41 Those cases es-
sentially deal with the securing of present and future benefits to the
debtor by transferring a security interest in all accounts receivable in
existence at the time of the security agreement or which are to come
into existence in the future. The cases hold that the transfer occurs
at the date the financing statement is filed by the creditor. In all
cases the filing takes place prior to the four-month period and the
creditors are able to obtain satisfaction on their debts despite the fact
that some of the collateral does not come into existence until within
the four-month period.
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the after-acquired cases differ
from the situation in E. F. Corporation, because in the former the
debtors had received all benefits under the security agreement prior
to the four-month period.2 While this is true in some of the after-
acquired cases, in others it is not. 3 For example, in Grain Merchants
v. Union Bank & Savings Company44 the debtor entered into a secu-
rity agreement with the creditor bank more than one year before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Under the agreement, the bank
was to make monthly loans to Grain Merchants secured by all of
Merchants' accounts receivable in existence at the time of the agree-
ment and all accounts receivable thereafter coming into existence.
Monthly loans were made by the bank up to one month prior to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. It would appear that Grain Mer-
to the trustee's rights and powers under § 70(c). See notes 31-33 and accompanying
text supra.
' See the cases cited in note 5 supra.
42 496 F.2d at 831.
4 The confusion of the Tenth Circuit in E. F. Corp. in attempting to distinguish
the after-acquired cases resulted from the court's failure to recognize that some secu-
rity agreements contain both future-advance and after-acquired property clauses. See,
e.g., In re Mid State Wood Prods. Co., 323 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ill. 1971); James Talcott
Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775 (1972). Thus, under that
type of security agreement both benefits and collateral would come into existence in
the future. This is a sound transaction under Article 9 of the Code. As the court in
Talcott stated: "[A] transaction between the parties may involve a combination of
both of these. . . .There is nothing exclusive about [§ 336] 9-204 (3,5). Parties may
use future-advance and after-acquired clauses, and they are a great convenience." 194
N.W.2d at 784.
4 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
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chants received benefits in the form of loans from the creditor both
before and during the four-month period. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's
attempt to distinguish the after-acquired cases on this basis is ten-
uous.
More importantly, by stating that the after-acquired cases sought
"to make security transactions conform to the legitimate needs of
commerce,"45 the Tenth Circuit attempted to show by implication
that awarding E. F. Corporation its total claim on the Rosen debts
would not have conformed to those needs of commerce. However,
security agreements such as the one in E. F. Corporation conform to
legitimate needs of commerce at least as much as the agreements in
the after-acquired cases. Unlike the debtor in the after-acquired situ-
ation, the debtor in a case like E. F. Corporation already has the
collateral at the time of the security agreement. It is beyond argu-
ment that a creditor is in a more secure position when the collateral
is already in existence at the time of the agreement than when the
agreement is secured by accounts receivable or other collateral which
might later come into existence. Yet, incongrously, under the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning only the latter type of creditor is held to be in the
position which more conforms to the legitimate needs of commerce
even though the former type had done everything possible to secure
his position as a creditor.
The commercial alternatives available to a creditor and debtor in
a situation like that found in E. F. Corporation are restricted by the
Tenth Circuit's decision. One possibility is that the debtor could give
immediate payment in full or could transfer the property to the credi-
tor at the time of the security agreement. However, that would be
unlikely where the debtor has not received, all of the benefits at the
time of the agreement. Alternatively, the creditor could obtain a note
from the debtor secured only to the extent of debts already existing,
with the future debts to be paid or secured as they come into exist-
ence. It would seem, however, that creditors would not be anxious to
embrace this less-than-secured position because it would necessitate
the making- of a security agreement, in the absence of immediate
payment, each time value was given in the form of services rendered.
Accordingly, the necessary requirements for perfection under § 84-
9-303,11 and especially the filing under § 84-9-302, would be a much
greater burden and inconvenience upon the creditor.47 And in a
496 F.2d at 831, citing DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1289 (9th Cir. 1969).
46 See note 34 supra.
'1 The inconvenience and time-consuming effect of the court's holding is not read-
ily apparent in E. F. Corp. because only two debts were created subsequent to the
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factual situation such as the one in E. F. Corporation, the creditor,
may choose not to enter into such security agreements at all. Since
there existed a substantial unsecured debt owing from Rosen to
Fox prior to the November 1971 agreement, it is apparent that Fox
felt sufficiently insecure to demand a note and collateral securing
that prior debt. Whether a creditor not wanting to deal with a debtor
on a less-than-secured basis would be willing to create a string of
security agreements in the future with the same debtor is doubt-
ful.48 In short, the commercial effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision
in E. F. Corporation is to disfavor the long-term security agreement
where all the collateral is in existence and made subject to the
agreement but the creditor does not provide all the benefits until
some time after the agreement is executed.
In addition to the commercial ramifications of the court's decision
in E. F. Corporation, the finding that Fox had attempted to create
an impermissible preference is unsound when analyzed -within.the'
framework of. the policy underlying the Bankruptcy Act. The -Act
seeks to eliminate the ability of secret creditors to obtain satisfaction
of their debts immediately before their debtor's bankruptcy. 9 This
November 1971 security agreement. That was probably due to the nature of outside
accounting services which might be performed only on a monthly or quarterly basis
for a corporation. However, the inconvenience inherent in the Tenth Circuit's holding
is brought into sharp focus by considering the situation where large amounts of ship-
ping, freight, or similar services are provided for a corporation on a weekly or even more
frequent basis. Notwithstanding the possibility of immediate payment each time the
services are performed, a shipper may want to secure payment for his contemplated
services well in advance of their actual performance. Under the court's holding in E.
F. Corp., however, the shipper would have to enter into a security agreement each time
services were performed in order to secure eventual payment. This would be an intoler-
able burden on and consumption of the creditor's time and energies.
" There is a second alternative for creditors. Because of the results in the after-
acquired cases, see note 5 supra, creditors could secure their future services by collat-
eral that would later come into existence. While case law supports that type of security
agreement, it is doubtful that a creditor would enter into it knowing, as in E. F. Corp.,
that the debtor already has sufficient collateral to secure the whole agreement.
11 This problem has long been a concern of the courts: "The object of prohibiting
preferences is to prevent favoritism, whether for secret benefit to himself or other
reason, among a debtor's creditors, who ought, in fairness, to stand on the same
footing." Furth v. Stahl, 205 Pa. 439, 55 A. 29, 30 (1903).
The Bankruptcy Act meets the problem of secret creditors in two ways. Under the
perfection requirement of § 60(a)(2), filing is required under the applicable state law
in order to perfect a security interest. This puts other creditors on notice. Also, the
four-month requirement of § 60(a) helps prevent what Collier refers to as the "scram-
bling and jockeying for position" by creditors when the debtor's financial position
becomes apparent. 3 COLLIER § 60.01, at 750.
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problem was not presented in E. F. Corporation." Since Fox had
adequately perfected the pre-November 1971 debt prior to the
four-month period, other creditors were put on notice by his filing
that Fox had a secured interest in $40,000 worth of Rosen's assets.'
Finally, with regard to developed doctrine under the Bankruptcy
Act, E. F. Corporation is irreconcilable with cases which have held
that where a mortgage on other security is given for both antecedent
and future indebtedness, the voidable preference exists only as to the
antecedent indebtedness even though the interest was not filed or
recorded and the future consideration not given until within the four-
month period.2 In re Great Lakes Lumber Company53 provided a
clear example of this principle. There, the creditor gave two loans to
the bankrupt, the first of which preceded the giving of a mortgage as
security for the initial loan and any which might follow the date of
the security agreement. The second loan was given almost one month
after the creation of the security interest but within the four-month
period. Accordingly, the court held that a preference arose only as to
the earlier loan and that the loan subsequent to the security interest
was an advance for present consideration.54 The idea that present or
contemporaneous consideration is not a voidable preference, given
the satisfaction of the perfection requirements, has been continuously
upheld by the courts.5 In E. F. Corporation, contemporaneous con-
sideration was given through performance of the accounting services
within the four-month period. Since filing had already occurred,
there was no voidable preference as to the collateral which had se-
cured Fox's performance. Therefore, in accord with Great Lakes
Lumber and other cases,5" Fox should have been allowed to recover
50 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
SI The notice to other creditors would also specifically indicate the assets covered
by the security agreement. Section 9-402(1) of the Code states that "A financing
statement is sufficient if it ... contains a statement indicating the types, or describ-
ing the items, of collateral." Thus, in allowing Fox to recover the $8,000 on the pre-
November 1971 debt, the Tenth Circuit necessarily implied that an adequate financing
statement had been filed under §§ 9-302(1) and 9-402(1).
52 See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Bruce, 109 F. 69 (4th Cir. 1901); In re Cable-Link
Corp., 135 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Mich. 1955); In re Sutherland Co., 245 F. 663 (D. Mass.
1917).
8 F.2d 96 (W.D. Pa. 1925).
5' Id. at 97.
See, e.g., In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); Aulick v. Largent,
295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961); Lake View State Bank v. Jones, 242 F. 821 (7th Cir. 1917);
In re Dismal Swamp Contracting Co., 135 F. 415 (E.D. Va. 1905); 4 REMINGTON §
1661.3, at 219-20.
" See In re Bloom, 15 F.2d 392, 393 (W.D. Pa. 1926); In re Schindler, 223 F. Supp.
512, 523 (E.D. Mo. 1963); and cases cited in note 52 supra.
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the $20,000 for services performed within the four-month period.
In E. F. Corporation, the Tenth Circuit dealt with the not uncom-
mon situation of existent collateral securing both past and future
indebtedness. However, the court did not adequately analyze the
effect of a creditor giving value within the four months preceding
bankruptcy when the other requirements for the perfection of that
creditor's security interest have been satisfied prior to the four-month
period. By failing to consider the issue of antecedent indebtedness the
court improperly applied the § 60 preference analysis. The Tenth
Circuit's failure to analyze the question of antecedent indebtedness
may create commercial and doctrinal problems under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Thus, it is likely that the E. F. Corporation decision will
be of little precedential value.
ScoTr THOMAS VAUGHN

